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Cape Verde stands out in West Africa as a country 
whose economic geography poses major and unique 
challenges for infrastructure development. Its small 
population of half a million people is spread across a 
nine-island archipelago. The islands need complementary 
infrastructure in terms of roads, water, transport, ports, 
power, and ICT. 
   Cape Verde already has well-developed infrastructure 
networks. Road density is relatively high, and most of 
the national network is paved. Almost all islands have 
port and airport facilities. Around 70 percent of the 
population has power and utility water. Indicators for 
ICT coverage—penetration, bandwidth, submarine 
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World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
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cable, private sector participation—are relatively good. 
Nevertheless, prices for all services are exceptionally high. 
The quality of services is often deficient. At least half of 
the national road network is in poor condition; power 
supply is unreliable; and half of the population receives 
water from standposts. 
   Cape Verde devotes around $147 million per year to 
infrastructure (almost 15 percent of GDP), among the 
highest levels of infrastructure spending on the continent. 
Some $50 million of that is lost each year to operations 
inefficiencies and underpricing. The country’s main 
challenges are to improve infrastructure management and 
reduce high costs of services.  
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Across West Africa, infrastructure improvements—most notably in the information and 
communications technology (ICT) sector—have contributed some 0.9 percentage points to recent 
improvements in per capita growth rates. Looking ahead, if West Africa’s infrastructure performance 
could be enhanced to the levels of Africa’s leading country, Mauritius, growth performance could be 
boosted by 2.9 percentage points per capita. 
Within Africa, Cape Verde stands out as a country whose economic geography poses major and 
unique challenges to infrastructure development. Cape Verde’s small population, comprising some half a 
million people, is spread across the nine islands that form the archipelago, many of them sparsely 
populated. This means that in addition to maintaining multiple road networks, the country needs a large 
number of functioning ports to assure internal connectivity, and also relies heavily on air transport for 
both domestic and international links. A lack of domestic energy resources leaves the country dependent 
on imported diesel fuel for power generation, while the small scale of the market makes the cost of both 
importing fuel and generating electricity exceptionally high. Marked water scarcity makes Cape Verde 
rely on desalination to meet 85 percent of its human water needs, and this energy-intensive process is 
made even more prohibitive by the high cost of power. Being at a significant distance of 500 kilometers 
(km) from the African coast means that Cape Verde must finance a significant spur from the regional 
submarine cable to ensure its access to broadband technology. 
As befits its middle-income status, Cape Verde already has quite well-developed infrastructure 
networks. Road density is relatively high, and around three-quarters of the national network is paved to 
some degree. Almost all of the nine islands have port and airport facilities. Around 70 percent of the 
population has access to power and (some form of) utility water. The country has access to a submarine 
cable, and indicators for ICT coverage—penetration and bandwidth—are relatively good. 
Nevertheless, prices of all services are exceptionally high, reflecting the high-cost environment 
described above. Power prices, at over $0.40 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), and water tariffs, at $4.43 per 
cubic meter (m
3), are by far the highest in Africa and must be among the highest in the world; yet, even 
so, cost recovery is inadequate. High prices have led to relatively low usage of infrastructure services: 
both power and water consumption are a fraction of middle-income levels. Prices of ICT services are also 
around 50 percent higher than regional benchmarks. 
In addition to high prices, the quality of services is often deficient. At least half of the national road 
network is in poor condition. The power sector has been plagued by unreliable supply. Around half of the 
population receiving utility water depends on standposts rather than private taps. There are also serious 
operational inefficiencies, including relatively high distribution losses for both power and water. 
On the institutional side, Cape Verde has been relatively open to private participation. A controlling 
share of the national power and water multiutility, ELECTRA, was sold to the private sector (though its 
stake was subsequently reduced to a minority one). Two licenses have been awarded for mobile telephony 
services, and the inter-island ferry service has been privatized. The government has also been considering 





Cape Verde devotes around $147 million per year—or almost 15 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP)—to infrastructure, one of the highest levels of infrastructure spending found on the African 
continent. Spending is quite heavily skewed toward capital expenditure, and the resources devoted to 
transport are particularly high relative to regional benchmarks. In addition, some $50 million a year is 
being lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, primarily underpricing and operational inefficiencies in the 
power sector.  
In sum, the main challenges for the country are to improve the effectiveness with which resources are 
being used, and to seek new approaches to reducing the exceptionally high costs of infrastructure service 
provision. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Cape Verde. The results have been 
presented in reports covering several sectors—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, water and sanitation—
and various policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for Cape Verde, allowing the country’s infrastructure 
situation to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that Cape Verde is a relatively well-
off middle-income country, its performance will be benchmarked against that of other middle-income 
countries in Africa. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional neighbors in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and where relevant, with other island states 
that face a similar set of infrastructure challenges 
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2006, yet 
most technical data presented are for 2006 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are 
typically averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Where 
possible, data have been collected for the period 2007 to 2009 to measure the progress made relative to 
the baseline. Second, to make comparisons across countries, we had to standardize the indicators and 
analysis; hence some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different from those that are 
routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
Alongside the rest of the continent, West Africa’s growth performance improved markedly between 
the 1990s and 2000s. The overall improvement in per capita growth rates has been estimated at close to 2 
percentage points, of which 1.1 percent is attributable to better structural policies and 0.9 percent to 
improved infrastructure. Although specific estimates are not available for Cape Verde, the experience of 
neighboring West African states suggests that the net per capita growth impact of infrastructure during 





(figure 1a). While the overall impact of infrastructure on growth was positive, in a number of countries 
deficient power infrastructure acted as a significant break on growth, as did inadequate road infrastructure 
in a few cases. 
Figure 1. Infrastructure has contributed much to economic growth—but could contribute much more  
a. Infrastructure’s contribution to annual per capita economic growth in selected countries, 
2003–07, in percentage points 
 
 
b. Potential contributions of infrastructure to annual per capita economic growth in selected 
countries, in percentage points 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
 
Looking ahead, simulations suggest that if the countries of West Africa were able to improve their 
infrastructure to the level of the African leader—Mauritius—annual per capita growth rates would be 2.9 
percentage points higher, on average, than they are at present. This impact would come mainly from 
improvements across the three main infrastructure sectors (roads, electricity, and telecommunications; see 
figure 1b). Overall, evidence from enterprise surveys suggests that infrastructure constraints are 
responsible for about 40 percent of the productivity handicap faced by African firms.  
The state of Cape Verde’s infrastructure 
Cape Verde’s geography has contributed to the nation’s relatively high cost of infrastructure services 























archipelago located 500 kilometers (km) off the West African coastline. Geographical fragmentation and 
a low population density necessitate the duplication of infrastructure facilities. For example, despite its 
small population Cape Verde has no fewer than three international airports, four aerodromes, and nine 
ports. The decentralized and very fragmented provision of utility services prevents capture of scale 
economies and drives up the cost and price of services, making it difficult to choose appropriate 
technologies.  
Figure 2. Population density 
 
Source: Plano Estratégico de Transportes—Strategic Transport Plan of Cape Verde. 
 
The country has no known oil resources, and water is extremely scarce. Cape Verde is entirely 
reliant on oil imports for its fuel supply, and the relatively small scale of its market contributes to 
the high price of this oil. With regard to water resources, Cape Verde has the lowest endowment of 
any Sub-Saharan African country except for Djibouti in the semi-arid Sahel region. Indeed, over the 
past 40 years rainfall has decreased sharply, to about half its former level. Underground resources are 
very limited, and only the islands of Santo Antão and Fogo have any significant water source. As a result, 
Cape Verde increasingly relies on desalination plants for water, which now account for approximately 85 
percent of production.  
Cape Verde’s isolated geography also limits the extent of its regional integration. Transport 
connections take the form of air and sea links. As of 2007 Dakar Senegal was acting as the main gateway 
for air transport service to Cape Verde, hosting daily flights. The country is already connected to the 
 















































Atlantis 2 cable, and plans to connect to a second cable, the WACS (West African Cable System), in 
2011. 
This report will now review the main achievements and challenges observed in Cape Verde’s major 
infrastructure sectors (see table 1 for a summary of key findings). It will then turn to the problem of how 
to finance Cape Verde’s outstanding infrastructure needs. 
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Cape Verde’s infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements   Challenges 
Air transport  Well-functioning network of airports 
Attained international security standards 
Continuing subsidies to TACV 
ICT  Market liberalization completed    
Rapid growth in coverage and penetration 
Access to submarine cable 
Reducing prices through enhanced competition 
Ports  Well-functioning network of ports  Completing institutional reform agenda 
Expanding capacity 
Power  High rates of electrification 
 
Maintaining tariffs at cost-recovery levels 
Reducing cost of power generation 
Improving efficiency of ELECTRA 
Roads  High-density road network    Establishment 
of road fund 
Improving road network conditions 
Securing adequate funds for maintenance 
Clarifying roles of sector institutions 
Water and sanitation  Good rates of access to utility water  Improving efficiency of ELECTRA 
Raising access to improved sanitation  
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on findings of this report. 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology; TACV = Cabo Verde Airlines. 
Roads 
Achievements 
Compared with similar countries, Cape Verde has a dense road network. Cape Verde’s main national 
network amounts to a little over 1,000 km, increasing to 1,600 km when urban and other unclassified 
roads are taken into account. There are only three islands with road networks in excess of 100 km: 
Santiago, Santo Antão, and Fogo. Nevertheless, given the small size of the country, road density 
(measured as a percentage of arable land)
1 is 3.5 in Cape Verde, higher than the comparator countries (for 
instance, Maldives, 2.2; Mauritius, 2.0; Indonesia, 1.6). This dense road network allows the entire 
population access to health, education, and other basic services. It also serves to interconnect the domestic 
market.  
Almost three-quarters of the national road network is paved. The rest of the network divides evenly 
between gravel and earth roads. The extent of paving varies significantly across islands, from 100 percent 
paved in San Nicolau and San Vicente to little more than 50 percent paved in Santiago. Cape Verde uses a 
                                                 
1 According to the World Bank Indicators, in 2003 the total land in Cape Verde was equal to 4,033 square kilometers 
(km
2), of which 11.4 percent was considered arable land (460.3 km
2). Thus, road density is the ratio of road length 
to arable land (in km
2): 1,607 km/460.3 km





variety of different paving technologies (mainly calçada de paralelos, and calçada Portuguesa—a local 
form of cobblestone); most of its paved roads are not conventional asphalt roads. 
Table 2. Cape Verde’s road network, 2005 
  Total length 
(kms) 
Condition (%)  Surface (%) 
Good  Fair  Poor  Paved*  Gravel  Earth 
National  1,002  25.0  23.1  52.0  73.7  12.4  14.0 
Santiago  364  16.8  8.7  74.5  55.6  6.1  38.3 
Santo Antao  196  47.6  31.0  21.4  97.6  2.4  0.0 
Fogo  169  40.0  16.8  43.2  72.6  14.7  12.6 
S. Nicolau  95  63.4  36.6  0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Maio  48  13.3  6.7  80.0  76.7  16.7  6.7 
S. Vicente  42  43.8  25.0  31.3  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Sal  41  25.8  28.8  45.3  70.9  17.3  11.8 
Boavista  30  8.3  28.4  63.3  78.1  17.2  4.7 
Brava  17  0.0  17.6  82.4  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Others  605  10.4  19.5  70.1  23.8  29.4  46.8 
Total  1,607  19.5  21.7  58.8  54.9  18.8  26.3 
Source: Instituto da Estrada—Roads Agency of Cape Verde.  
Note: * Paved roads cover a number of technologies, including betao bituminso, bicouche, calçada de paralelos, and calçada Portuguesa 
(some of which are local forms of cobblestone). Few paved roads are conventional asphalt roads. 
Challenges 
At least half of the national network is in poor condition, according to data reported by the national 
road institute for the mid-2000s. A more recent, 2008 transport strategy document suggests that this share 
may have risen to nearly 70 percent. The quality of the network varies considerably across the country. 
For instance, while the network in San Nicolau appears to be almost entirely in good or fair condition, 
about three-quarters of the network in Santiago is reported to be in poor condition. Overall, the situation 
suggests that Cape Verde’s policy of extending the network to low-density areas, in which economic 
returns are low, may have raised maintenance costs to an unsustainable level, or that this maintenance 
may not have been planned or accounted for. 
Despite the establishment of a road maintenance fund, securing adequate funds for network 
preservation has proved to be a challenge. A new road maintenance fund became operational in 2006, 
implemented by a mechanism that transfers the taxation proceeds from the point of collection directly to 
the fund for use by the road institute. The accounts of the fund are public, and accountability ensured. The 
fund is maintained at a minimum—guaranteed by the Treasury—of CVE 300 million, or just under $4 
million. In 2006 customs transferred taxes to the road maintenance fund, while in 2007 and 2008 the fund 
was subsidized by the Treasury, albeit at a level below the guaranteed rate. In 2009 the Council of 
Ministers approved a fuel levy of CVE 7 per liter, equivalent to around $0.09. This is a mid-range levy 
when compared to others observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The road agency has tended to overreach its maintenance role by managing the construction of new 
roads. The mandate of the road agency is to maintain the national road network. The government 





Thus, the road agency has no formal capacity or experience in procuring, coordinating, or supervising 
road investments. Despite this fact, in 2007 it was managing the construction of new roads. The road 
agency needs to expand its technical staff to serve effectively in this role.  
Ports 
Achievements 
Maritime transportation is of great importance in Cape Verde, given that the country is an 
archipelago. All the islands have ports that allow maritime access: nine in total, of which three (Praia, 
Porto Grande, and Porto da Palmeira) receive international traffic. The ports of Fogo, Brava, and Santo 
Antão are very small, which limits the types of vessels traveling to these islands. Of the three 
international ports, only Porto Grande and Praia have the capacity to receive large ships and move and 
store containers. Overall traffic increased significantly from 2004 to 2006, as container traffic grew at an 
average annual rate of 20 percent and general cargo traffic at 10 percent.  
Challenges 
Cape Verde has been considering a transition from the service to landlord port model. All ports are 
state owned and managed by the state port authority, ENAPOR, under the service port concept. The 
government decided long ago to privatize the ENAPOR management, but the process has met many 
obstacles. The government’s reform plans include the adoption of legislation to create a port 
administration (superseding ENAPOR) that would operate under a landlord model, regulating port 
operations while frontline port activities at all national ports would be delegated to the private sector via 
management or concession contracts.  
The expansion of port capacity in Cape Verde is a priority. At Mindelo there is a plan to expand port 
capacity to meet an anticipated increase in transshipment activity. Plans are at an outline stage, but the 
project appears to be gathering momentum. In Praia nearly half of the $117 million allocated to Cape 
Verde under the Millennium Challenge Account has been invested in a major upgrade of the port. The 
port will be divided into two maritime areas: Santa Maria and Santo Antão, the former comprising 
facilities to provide passenger-related shipping services—cruise, roll on–roll off, and catamarans—and 
the latter, new facilities for cargo operations. 
The main inter-island ferry service has already been privatized, and a subsidy ensures minimum 
service on low-demand routes. Even if not profitable, such connections are important to interconnect the 
domestic market and also from a social point of view. That said, both local inhabitants and tourists have 
criticized ships that combine passengers and cargo for running late. 
Port performance leaves something to be desired. Benchmarking the performance of Cape Verde’s 
largest port, Porto Grande at Mindelo, against other West African ports illustrates the relatively small size 
of the country’s port operations. While service charges are reasonable by West African standards, the 
level of port performance does not compare very favorably. For example, the average container dwell 
time is 16 days at Mindelo compared with 7 days in Dakar, while the vessel pre-berth waiting time is 24 





































































































































































Capacity                 
Actual containers handled 
(‘000sTEU/year)  170  471  336  306  500  158  437  1,899 
Actual general cargo handled (‘000s 
tonnes/year)  699  7,900  3,400  6,109  n.a.  1,100  12,980  16,100 
General-cargo-handling capacity (‘000s 
tonnes/year)  800  8,500  5,000  n.a.  n.a.  2,500  1,500  n.a. 
Efficiency                 
Average container dwell time in terminal 
(days)  16  25  42  7  12  12  5  4 
Average truck-processing time for receipt 
and delivery of cargo (hours)  6  8  6  5  2.5  6  4.5  5 
General-cargo vessel preberth waiting 
time (hours)  24  9.6  n.a.  24  2.9  48  36  n.a. 
General-cargo vessel turnaround time 
(hours)  36  48  n.a.  60  2.2  48  48  n.a. 
Average container crane productivity 
(containers loaded/unloaded per crane 
hour) 
n.a.  13  12  n.a.  18    10  15 
Average general-cargo crane productivity 
(tonnes loaded/unloaded per crane 
working hour) 
6  13.5  9  n.a.  16  15  20.8  25 
Tariffs                 
Average container-handling charge, ship 
to gate ($/TEU)  100  168  155  160  260  180  67.5  258 
Average general-cargo-handling charge, 
ship to gate ($/tonne)  10.0  10.0  8.0  15.0  13.5  8.5  6.5  8.4 
Average dry-bulk-handling charge, ship 
to gate or rail ($/tonne)  5.0  3.0  n.a.  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0  1.4 
Average liquid-bulk-handling charge, ship 
to gate or rail ($/tonne)  2.5  1.5  1.0  4.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants 2009. Derived from the AICD ports database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: TEU = 20-foot equivalent units. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
Air transport 
Achievements  
Given Cape Verde’s isolation and growing tourism industry, air transport plays an important role in 
the economy. Cape Verde now has four international airports (Sal, Praia, Boa Vista, and São Vicente) as 
well as three additional aerodromes. The international airports, including their buildings, facilities, and 





domestic traffic only. Sal and Praia are the only 24-hour operational airports, with about half of the traffic 
concentrated at Sal. Sal was long used by South African Airlines as a transit stop for North American 
flights, but these flights have since been rerouted to Accra and Dakar. The booming tourism industry has 
ensured the entrance of new airlines (scheduled and charter) into the market. Air traffic grew at a modest 
average annual rate of 2.5 percent in 2001–06, while connectivity (as measured by the number of city 
pairs served) has increased significantly.  
Cape Verde’s domestic air transport market looks large relative to its West African neighbors due to 
the use of air travel to interconnect the archipelago; while its international air transport market looks quite 
small. Nevertheless, relative to its small population, Cape Verde makes very intensive use of air transport; 
2.4 seats are available per capita, compared to 0.2 seats in Senegal. The limited size of the market means 
that there is a high degree of concentration: Cape Verde has the highest Herfindahl index of the 
comparator countries.
2  
From a safety perspective, Cape Verde performs well. It is one of a handful of African countries that 
have passed an audit by the Federal Aviation Administration/ International Aviation Safety Association 
(FAA/IASA), with both Sal and Praia satisfying Category I requirements. This safety certification for 
both air traffic control and airport operations requires costly investments in facilities and training. In 
addition, the fleet is almost entirely made up of new aircraft. The flag carrier Cabo Verde Airlines 
(TACV) enjoys the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA’s) Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) 
certification, and offers direct flights to the United States as well as to Europe. 
Airports are managed by a state-owned enterprise, Empresa Nacional de Aeroportos e Segurança 
Aérea (ASA). The company is corporatized and has followed standard business procedures since 2001. 
Activities include the support of civil aviation; air traffic management; services related to the departure, 
arrival, and overflight of aircraft; and management of terminals and freight couriers. Due to Cape Verde’s 
strategic location in the Atlantic, the Flight Information Region and associated flight information and 
alerting services represent the main source of company revenue. 
Challenges  
The national carrier remains state owned and absorbs significant government subsidies. Air transport, 
domestic and international, is offered by TACV with a fleet of five aircraft. Even though the government 
decided to privatize the company several years ago, the process has been lengthy and inconclusive, and 
TACV remains state owned. According to government analysis, international flights break even and inter-
island flights are not profitable. Though TACV expanded seat capacity by more than 10 percent annually 
over the period 2001–06, traffic growth did not keep pace, resulting in declining aircraft load factors. As a 
result, the government has systematically channeled significant financial and human resources to the 
aeronautical sector. Indeed, spending on air transport (mainly on TACV) absorbs approximately 40 
percent of total infrastructure spending (or 11 percent of GDP); almost all of these resources are allocated 
to operations and maintenance (O&M).  
                                                 
2 The Herfindahl index, a measure of market concentration, is computed by summing the squares of the market share 





Despite high levels of safety, TACV suffers from operational management problems that tend to 
undermine the reliability of scheduling and baggage-handling services. The entry of a new operator 
competing with TACV on West African routes would serve to create pressure for service improvements. 
Table 4. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Cape Verde and selected West African countries 
Country   Cape 
Verde  Ghana  Côte 
d’Ivoire  Senegal  Kenya  Tanzania 
Traffic (2007)              
Domestic seats (millions per year)  0.58  0.14   0  0.13   2.09    1.87  
Seats for international travel within Africa (millions per year)   0.54  0.91   0.85    1.26   3.14   1.27  
Seats for intercontinental travel (millions per year)  0.06  0.83   0.30    1.23  2.76  0.59 
Seats available per capita  2.40  0.08   0.06   0.23     0.28   0.12  
Herfindahl index—domestic market (%)  100.0  100.0  —  100.0  60.5  31.0 
Herfindahl index—international market (%)  42.0  6.4  9.8  10.3  34.1  13.0 
Quality              
Percent of seat km in medium or smaller aircraft   93.6  15.7  52.3  39.3  23.3  48.6 
Percent of seat km in newer aircraft   99.1  96.8  90.8  98.3  80.2  79.3 
Registered carriers on EU blacklist  0  0  0  0  0  0 
FAA/IASA audit status  Pass  Fail  Fail  No audit   No audit   No audit  
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA audit  50.0  0  0  50.0  11.1  33.3 
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from the AICD national database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: EU = European Union; FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Association; IATA = International Air 
Transport Association; IOSA = IATA Operational Safety Audit. 
Power 
Achievements 
Cape Verde has achieved a relatively high rate of electrification that—at 66 percent of the 
population—compares favorably with other middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 5). 
This outcome reflects a strong political commitment to provide basic services to the entire population. 
The national power and water utility has a minority private sector stake. Power is supplied by the 
multi-utility ELECTRA, which is also responsible for water supply on at least some of the islands. In 
1999 ELECTRA became a public-private partnership through the sale of 51 percent of the share value of 
the production assets of electricity and water. The government retained 34 percent of the share value, and 
the municipalities retained 15 percent. As a result of a series of failed negotiations between the private 
stakeholders and the government, the state regained the position of major shareholder (51 percent) in May 






Blackouts became more frequent during the mid-2000s due to a tight demand-supply balance. 
Between 2002 and 2006, installed capacity decreased approximately 4.4 percent, while connections rose 
by 40 percent and production by 10 percent. As a result of the tight demand-supply balance, the incidence 
of blackouts more than tripled and became longer in duration. According to the Investment Climate 
Survey (2006), firms in Cape Verde perceive the poor performance of the power sector as the greatest 
constraint on their operations and growth. Over 60 percent of the firms surveyed see the condition of the 
power sector as a major or very severe obstacle to their business. 
ELECTRA’s operational performance is not all that impressive. It certainly falls well short of the 
African middle-income-country benchmarks for utility performance. In fact, on aspects such as collection 
efficiency, distribution losses, and cost recovery, ELECTRA’s performance was very close to the African 
low-income-country benchmark for 2006 (table 5). While the collection ratio improved gradually during 
the period 2006–09, system losses deteriorated substantially, reaching 26 percent by 2009 (table 6). These 
operational inefficiencies led to substantial hidden costs for the sector, amounting to over 1 percent of 
GDP by 2009 (figure 5). 
Cape Verde’s power prices are among the most expensive in Africa (figure 3). Energy production is 
largely dependent on diesel plants, which in turn rely on expensive fuel imports. A single power price is 
applied across all the islands despite differences in costs—a geographical cross-subsidization that is 
justified on the grounds of social equity. Due to the small size of the system, the decision of a single large 
customer (such as a hotel) to self-supply can substantially increase the costs of power across the system as 
it reduces scale economies. The authorities are planning to replace diesel-fired generating plants with 
plants that use fuel oil, which would immediately halve the costs of fuel. The government also plans to 
invest in renewable energy to improve technical efficiency and reduce oil dependency. 
Figure 3. Comparison of electricity tariffs across Africa  
 
Source: Derived from Eberhard and others (2008). 
 
Although power prices are relatively high, they have nonetheless failed to recover the full economic 
costs of production. Inadequate tariff setting has long been a critical issue, exacerbated by burgeoning oil 
prices. Given that fuel costs represent 70 percent of power production costs, a lack of adjustment in 







































company’s capital (figure 4). In 2000 it was agreed that both power and water tariffs would be adjusted 
once fuel prices exceeded a threshold value of $0.42 per liter. These adjustments failed to take place. 
Instead, the state compensated for rising fuel prices with a direct subsidy that, as of 2005, amounted to 
$4.4 million annually. In April 2006 the authorities eliminated this oil subsidy and implemented a series 
of tariff hikes that failed to fully compensate for further increases in the price of oil. Thereafter, the 
regulatory agency introduced an automatic adjustment mechanism for electricity and water tariffs linked 
to the price of petroleum, although none of these mechanisms is being applied as stated by law. While the 
measures taken in the mid-2000s served to stem the hidden costs associated with underpricing in the 
sector, by 2006 they were growing again. Hidden costs associated with ELECTRA’s power service 
remained in the range of 1.0 to 1.5 percent of GDP for much of this period, making them material at the 
macroeconomic level (figure 5). 
Table 5. Benchmarking power indicators, 2006 
  
Unit  Low-income countries  Cape Verde 
Middle-income 
countries 
Installed power generation capacity  MW/million people  24.41  153.9  796.2 
Power consumption  kWh/capita  99.5  89.0  4,473 
Power outages  Day/year  40.6  150.4  5.6 
Firms’ reliance on own generator   % consumption  17.7  4.6  0.5 
Firms’ value lost due to power 
outages 
% sales  6.1  8.9  0.8 
Access to electricity  % population  15.4  66.0  59.9 
Urban access to electricity  % population  71  —  83.7 
Rural access to electricity  % population  12  —  33.4 
Growth access to electricity  % population/year  1.4  —  1.8 
Revenue collection  % billings  88.2  86.9  99.9 
Distribution losses  % production  22.1  21.5  15.7 
Cost recovery  % total cost  90.0  71.3  125.7 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  67.5  72.3  3.5 
    Countries using 
predominantly thermal 
generation  Cape Verde 
Other developing 
regions 
Power tariff (residential at 75 kWh)  U.S. cents  16.0  25.1  5.0–10.0 
Source: Eberhard and others 2008. Derived from the AICD electricity database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).  
Note: GWh = gigawatt-hour; kWh = kilowatt-hour; MW = megawatts. 
 





Table 6. Evolution of hidden costs associated with ELECTRA’s power operations  














  (GWh/year)  (%)  (%)  ($/kWh)  ($/kWh)  ($ million/year)  (% revenue) 
2001  96  22.7  91.0  0.23  0.118  14.5  129.0 
2002  117  17.0  89.6  0.23  0.124  16.1  111.0 
2003  133  17.9  88.1  0.27  0.179  16.8  73.4 
2004  147  18.5  96.5  0.27  0.192  16.0  57.5 
2005  162  17.3  89.3  0.27  0.192  18.5  63.5 
2006  165  21.5  86.9  0.30  0.214  25.0  72.3 
2007  174  25.2  96.6  0.40  0.273  34.8  76.5 
2008  181  26.8  92.0  0.42  0.321  34.9  52.6 
2009  185  26.1  92.8  0.41  0.330  31.6  44.8 
Source: Derived from ELECTRA Annual Reports 2001–09.  
Note: kWh = kilowatt-hour; GWh = gigawatt-hour. 
 
Figure 4. Trend for oil and electricity prices in Cape Verde 
 




























































Figure 5. Evolution of hidden costs in Cape Verde’s power sector 
 
Source: Derived from ELECTRA Annual Reports 2001–09.  
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
Water and sewerage services in Cape Verde are also provided by the multiutility ELECTRA to the 
islands of São Vicente, Sal, Boavista, and the city of Praia. As noted above, this utility provides power 
service throughout the archipelago. In the rest of the country, water service is provided directly by local 
municipalities. (See the power section, above, for more on the institutional and operational issues 
affecting ELECTRA.) 
Challenges 
Cape Verde has relatively good access to utility water but relies heavily on standposts. About 70 
percent of the population has access to utility water, comparable to the benchmark for African middle-
income countries. In contrast to other middle-income countries, however, about half of those accessing 
utility water do so through standposts. Relative to low-income countries, access to both private taps and 
standposts is substantially higher, and there is noticeably less reliance on wells and boreholes. 
Access patterns to sanitation are split, more or less, in two: half the population enjoys high-end 
solutions while the other half receives little service of any kind. On the one hand, coverage of flush 
toilets, at almost 50 percent, is slightly above the benchmark for middle-income countries in Africa. On 
the other hand, 50 percent of the population has no access to sanitation of any kind, which is even worse 
than the benchmark for low-income countries in Africa. Less than 10 percent of the population has access 
to latrines. Given Cape Verde’s relatively good performance on household service coverage, these figures 
suggest that sanitation has been neglected relative to other household services. Clearly, the country has 
failed to develop a second-best sanitation alternative for citizens without access to a flush toilet. 
Cape Verde has by far the most expensive water tariffs in Africa—and among the most expensive in 
the world—at over $3/m
3. These high prices reflect the scarcity of water resources, which has forced the 
country to rely on desalination for approximately 85 percent of production. Moreover, the cost of the 
energy-intensive desalination process is particularly high due to its dependence on power generation, 



























high cost of water in Cape Verde is largely a reflection of local hydrology; little can be done to alter it, 
other than adopting lower-cost technologies for power generation. Reflecting increases in the price of oil, 
water tariffs increased further to over $4/m
3 in 2008. It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which water 
tariffs fully cover costs. Since ELECTRA is a multi-utility, it is not possible to correctly allocate energy 
costs between the power and water operations of the company. For this analysis, energy costs have been 
fully allocated to the power sector, which may overestimate the underpricing of power and underestimate 
the underpricing of water. (See the power section for a more detailed discussion of the pricing challenges 
facing ELECTRA.)  
ELECTRA’s operational performance does not compare favorably with its middle-income peers. 
Domestic water consumption in Cape Verde, at around 35 liters per capita per day, is close to subsistence 
levels and just about half that found in the low-income peer group. This finding is consistent with the 
extreme shortage and high cost of water on the islands. As of 2006 performance on key operational 
parameters such as revenue collection and distribution losses lagged well behind those of the African 
middle-income peer group and were more comparable to the low-income group. Since then, distribution 
losses have further deteriorated—reaching 35 percent by 2009—which is cause for concern, given the 
high cost of water. Over the same period, however, the collection ratio improved, nearing 99 percent 
(table 6). Thanks to improvements in revenue collection, hidden costs fell significantly in the late 2000s, 
to around 0.15 percent of GDP (figure 7). 
Figure 6. Comparison of water tariffs across Africa  
 
Source: Derived from Banerjee, Foster, and others (2008). 
Note: Horizontal axis presents names of selected water companies in region.  
 





































Table 7. Benchmarking water and sanitation indicators, 2006 
  
Unit  Low-income countries  Cape Verde 
Middle-income 
countries 
Access to piped water  % pop  10.1  34.9  56.4 
Access to standposts  % pop  16.1  36.5  20.4 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  38.3  10.1  10.1 
Access to surface water  % pop  33.8  14.3  13.9 
Access to flush toilets  % pop  5.3  48.7  44.0 
Access to latrines  % pop  57.2  8.3  33.9 
Open defecation  % pop  37.1  45.4  15.8 
Domestic water consumption   liter/capita/day  72.4  34.6  n.a. 
Revenue collection  % sales  96.0  93.3  99.2 
Distribution losses  % production  33.0  29.8  23.1 
Operating cost recovery  % total costs  56.0  484.8  80.6 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  130.0  10.2  84.9 
    Countries with scarce 
water resources  Cape Verde 
Other developing 
regions 
Residential tariff  U.S. cents per m3  309.30  60.26 
3.0–60.0 
Nonresidential tariff  U.S. cents per m3  453.30  120.74 
Source: Banerjee, Skilling, and others 2008; Morella, Foster, and Banerjee 2008. Derived from the AICD water and sanitation utilities database 
(http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). Access data comes from DHS (2005) as presented by the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring 
Programme. 
Note: m3 = cubic meter. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
Table 8. Evolution of hidden costs associated with ELECTRA’s water operations  














  (Mm3/year)  (%)  (%)  ($/kWh)  ($/kWh)  ($ million/year)  (% revenue) 
2000  3.0  25.9  91.0  0.86  1.70  0.6  16.4 
2001  3.0  22.8  91.0  0.91  1.64  0.5  12.5 
2002  3.6  27.6  95.9  0.73  1.72  0.6  13.7 
2003  4.0  29.1  83.9  0.84  2.83  2.2  28.1 
2004  4.1  29.7  94.4  1.13  3.13  1.6  17.8 
2005  4.3  30.8  98.0  1.10  3.17  1.4  15.4 
2006  4.3  29.8  93.3  0.66  3.20  1.8  18.1 
2007  4.2  30.6  104.8  1.27  3.83  1.5  13.0 
2008  4.2  31.5  98.1  0.55  4.31  2.0  16.4 
2009  4.5  35.3  99.1  0.76  4.43  2.6  21.9 
Source: Derived from ELECTRA Annual Reports 2001/09.  
Note: Mm3 = millions of cubic meters; kWh = kilowatt-hour. 





Figure 7. Evolution of hidden costs in Cape Verde’s water sector 
 
Source: Derived from ELECTRA Annual Reports 2001–09.  
Information and communications technologies 
Achievements 
Cape Verde has made substantial progress in expanding access to ICT (table 9, top). The percentage 
of the population with a mobile phone rose from 17 percent in 2005 to 69 percent in 2009. In 2005 just 5 
out of 100 people were Internet users; in 2009 this number was 22— the second-highest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (after Mauritius).  
Significant reform of the ICT sector has taken place since the mid-2000s. A new telecommunications 
law was introduced in 2005 that ended the fixed and international communications monopoly of Cape 
Verde Telecom (CVT). The National Agency for Communications (Agência Nacional das Comunicações, 
ANAC), the industry regulator, was created in 2006. A second mobile operator, T+ Telecomunicações, 
was launched in December 2007 as a competitor to CVT.  






















Table 9. Benchmarking ICT indicators  
  Unit  Cape Verde  Cape Verde  Lower-middle-
income group 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  Cape Verde 
    2005  2008  2008  2008  2009 
GSM coverage  % population  74  83  77  56  84 
International bandwidth  Mbps/capita  35  310  153  34  604 
Internet  Users/100 people  5  10  14  7  22 
Landline  Lines/100 people  15  14  14  2  14 
Mobile phone  Subscribers/100 people  17  56  47  33  68 
Price of monthly mobile basket  18.1  16.7  8.4  11.8  20.5 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  4.7  5.4  4.8  11.6  9.1 
Price of monthly fixed broadband Internet package  —  45  31.4  100.1  32 
Price of a call to the United States ($/min)  2.0  1.3  —  0.7  0.86 
  —  1.3  —  1.02  0.86 
Source: Ampah and others 2009; World Bank ICT at a Glance Database, National Communications Agency (ANAC).Derived from the AICD 
national database (http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).  
Note: ICT = information and communications technology; GSM = global system for mobile communications; Mbps = megabits per second. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
— = Not available.  
Challenges 
Cape Verde faces the challenge of increasing ICT access as a small island developing state with only 
recent, limited experience in sector liberalization. While the experience of introducing competition into 
the mobile sector has been positive, with a significant increase in both penetration and coverage, access 
still lags behind other countries with similar levels of income. Nascent regulatory skills and the small size 
of the market constrain competition, resulting in relatively high tariffs (table 9, bottom). Fixed-line prices 
have been rebalanced, with subscription and local call charges rising sharply while international call 
charges have fallen. On the other hand, prepaid mobile prices have actually risen since the introduction of 
competition. This has been mitigated to some extent by the introduction of per-second tariffs—but at the 
cost of more expensive prices for heavy users. The one bright spot in this picture is broadband pricing, 
which has fallen.  
To better utilize submarine cables, key access facilities must be prevented from establishing 
monopolistic bottlenecks. In the Internet market the incumbent controls the fixed-telephone network 
necessary for providing broadband access. Cape Verde has been fortunate to have a high-speed undersea 
fiber-optic connection through the Atlantis 2 cable since 2000. But the incumbent controls this and is also 
an investor in a second cable, the WACS (West African Cable System), scheduled for launch in 2011. 
Regulatory tools are needed to enhance access through these bottleneck facilities. Six of the most 
populated islands were connected by a submarine cable fiber-optic system in 2002, with the rest to be 
connected in 2011. 
Competition in both mobile and broadband markets should intensify with the planned introduction of 
third-generation (3G) mobile networks and a third mobile operator. This should boost the country’s 
relatively high ICT position within the region (table 9) and enhance the possibility of meeting Cape 





There is still significant scope for commercially viable expansion of global system for mobile 
communications (GSM) coverage into rural areas. Cape Verde has made substantial progress in 
expanding the percentage of the population living within range of a GSM signal, which rose from 62 
percent in 2005 to 83 percent in 2008. Nevertheless, this value falls short of simulations, suggesting it 
would be feasible to provide a GSM signal to almost 100 percent of the population on a commercially 
viable basis (figure 8). Most islands would even be commercially viable for universal access to limited-
performance WIMAX
3 broadband via public telecenter facilities (figure 9).  
Figure 8. Almost all of Cape Verde’s population could be commercially served with a GSM signal 
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009.  
Note: GSM = global system for mobile communications. Bar segments in gray represent the percentage of population currently covered by 
voice infrastructure as of the third quarter of 2006. 
Bar segments in white represent the efficient-market gap—the percentage of the population for whom voice telecommunications services are 
commercially viable given efficient and competitive markets.  
Bar segments in black represent the coverage gap—the percentage of the population for whom services are not viable without subsidy.  
                                                 
3 WIMAX = Worldwide interoperability for microwave access. 
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Figure 9. Only isolated pockets of Cape Verde’s territory are not commercially viable for voice and broadband 








Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
Note: Existing coverage relates to base year of 2006. GSM = global system for mobile communications; WIMAX = worldwide interoperability for 
microwave access. 
Financing Cape Verde’s infrastructure 
Cape Verde already dedicates a substantial volume of its resources to infrastructure. Average annual 
spending in the mid-2000s amounted to $147 million annually (table 10). About half of this amount is 
dedicated to the transport sector (and to air transport in particular). The substantial weight of transport 
spending reflects the challenging geographical characteristics of the country. Power comes in second 
place, at $44 million annually, followed by water and sanitation, at $25 million annually. Existing 
spending is skewed toward capital expenditure, which accounts for more than 70 percent of the total. 
How much does Cape Verde spend on infrastructure? 
Cape Verde’s spending amounted to a remarkable 15 percent of GDP in 2006 (figure 10). This makes 
Cape Verde one of the highest-spending African countries on infrastructure relative to its national 
income, with a spending effort about twice the average level for middle-income countries in Africa. 
Indeed, this level of effort approaches that of China during the 2000s, when 15 percent of the country’s 
GDP was invested in infrastructure (not counting O&M). Compared to other middle-income countries in 
Africa, Cape Verde receives a relatively large amount of official development assistance (ODA) to 





investment patterns are also very distinct, heavily skewed toward transport, while in other countries they 
are more skewed toward ICT. 
Table 10. Financial flows to Cape Verde’s infrastructure, average 2001 to 2006 
$ millions per year 
 
O&M  Capital expenditure 
Total 
spending  Public sector  Public sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI  Total capex 
ICT  0  0  1  1  0  2  2 
Power   34  9  0  1  0  10  44 
Transport   2  28  45  1  0  74  77 
WSS  4  12  9  0  0  22  25 
Total  40  50  55  3  0  107  147 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Capex = capital expenditure; ICT = information and communications technology; O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official 
development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; WSS 
= water supply and sanitation. 
 
Figure 10. Cape Verde’s existing infrastructure spending is very high in GDP terms 
 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Capex = Capital expenditure; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; GDP = gross domestic product.  
 
   






















Figure 11. Cape Verde’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure differs from that of comparator countries 
 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source
 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2008). 
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. GDP = gross domestic product; ICT = information and communications 
technology; ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PPI = private 
participation in infrastructure; WSS = water supply and sanitation. 
How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
Some $50 million of additional resources could be recovered each year by improving efficiency (table 
11). By far the largest potential source of efficiency gains is the power sector, with potential efficiency 
gains valued at $25 million annually if underpricing and distribution losses are addressed. Low capital 
budget execution is also a significant issue, affecting both the transport and water sectors to the tune of 
$12 million annually.  
Table 11. Potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
 $ millions per year 
 
ICT  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Underpricing  —  15  n.a.  0  15 
Overstaffing  n.a.  3  —  1  4 
Distribution losses  —  12  —  2  15 
Undercollection  —  4  n.a.  0  4 
Low budget execution  0  1  5  6  12 
Total  0  35  5  9  50 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: ICT = information and communications technology; WSS = water supply and sanitation. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
— = Not available. 
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The extent of underpricing is exceptionally high for power, but apparently not for water. Despite 
Cape Verde’s relatively high power tariffs, the extent of underpricing in the power sector amounts to 
almost 1 percent of GDP, representing an economic burden almost twice as large as that found in the 
middle-income peer group (figure 12). The difficulties of cost allocation make it difficult to reliably 
establish the extent to which water is underpriced, although with tariffs in excess of $4/m
3, this does not 
appear to be a major concern (in contrast to other middle-income countries). 
Figure 12. Underpricing of power and water does not seem to be an issue in Cape Verde 
Financial burden of underpricing in 2006, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2008). 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
 
Underpricing of power and water represents an implicit subsidy to these sectors that is highly 
regressive in its distributional incidence. This to a large extent mirrors the distributional incidence of 
access to power and water services in the country. A recent study found that—in common with most other 
countries in Africa—subsidized utility tariffs in Cape Verde are highly regressive, with an omega value 
well below 1 (figure 13). This means that the share of power subsidies that reach the poor is only half as 
much as what should reach them, given their share of the population, while the share of water subsidies 
that reach the poor is only a quarter of what it should be. 
Although cost-recovery tariffs are high, they appear to be within the reach of household budgets, at 
least at very modest levels of subsistence consumption. Given the exceptionally high costs of producing 
power and water services in Cape Verde, and the already high level of tariffs, it is legitimate to ask 
whether full cost-recovery tariffs would be affordable to consumers. How expensive would utility bills 
become if cost-reflective tariffs were applied? With a cost-recovery power tariff of $0.41/kWh and a 
monthly subsistence consumption of 25 kWh, the associated power bill would come to $10.25 per month. 
With a cost-recovery tariff of $4.43/m
3 and a monthly subsistence consumption of 4 m
3, the associated 
water bill would come to $17.72 per month. Based on the distribution of household budgets in Cape 
























Figure 13. Africa’s electricity and water subsidies are highly regressive 
a. Electricity  b. Water 
   
Source: Banerjee, Wodon, and others 2008. 
Note: Omega is a measure of distributional incidence that measures the share of subsidies received by the poor as a percentage of their share 
in the population. The higher the value of omega, the better the distributional performance of the subsidy. Values of omega below 1 denote a 
regressive subsidy; values of omega above 1 denote a progressive subsidy. 
 
Figure 14. Affordability in Cape Verde is much better than in other middle-income countries 
 
Source: Banerjee, Wodon, and others 2008. 
Note: m3 =cubic meter; kwh = kilowatt-hour. 
 























































































































































Monthly utility bill (US$)
Cape Verde
middle-income countries
Average cost of power is $11.50/month per 50 kwh
Average cost of water is $19.44 month per 6 m3
Power cost-recovery tariff is $0.23/kwh





ELECTRA’s operational performance leads to substantial hidden costs compared to those of utilities 
in other African middle-income countries. Operational inefficiencies of power and water utilities cost 
Cape Verde a further $23 million a year, equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP. The annual value of 
inefficiencies in the power sector (at $19 million) is substantially higher than for the water sector (at $4 
million). The burden of utility inefficiencies in Cape Verde is substantially higher than for the middle-
income peer group (figure 15). In both sectors, it is high distribution losses (as opposed to low revenue 
collection) that are primarily responsible for the weak performance.  
Figure 15. Cape Verde’s utilities are highly inefficient relative to middle-income peers 
a. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the power sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
b. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the water sector, as a 
percentage of GDP  
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2008). 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; MIC = middle-income countries. 
 
In sum, Cape Verde dedicates an exceptionally high share of its national resources to the 
infrastructure sectors, reflecting in part the exceptionally high costs presented by the country’s 
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About AICD and its country reports 
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. The AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on 
African infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, 
spending needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, 
information and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s 
Infrastructure—A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de 
Développement in November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the 
main financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 
(Group of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor 
finance for infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The first phase of the AICD focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross 
domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, 
coverage was expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara 
that face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North 
African countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the 
term Africa is used throughout this report as a shorthand for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that 
represents the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional 
economic communities, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA), and major infrastructure donors.   
 
 
Financing for the AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund to which the main contributors are the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Public Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Commission, and 
Germany’s Entwicklungsbank (KfW). A group of distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the major outputs of the study to ensure the 
technical quality of the work. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program and the Water and 
Sanitation Program provided technical support on data collection and analysis pertaining to their 
respective sectors. 
The data underlying AICD’s reports, as well as the reports themselves, are available to the public 
through an interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that allows users to download customized 
data reports and perform various simulations. Many AICD outputs will appear in the World Bank’s 
Policy Research Working Papers series. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of data sets should be directed to the volume editors at the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 